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Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

**From the Archives (1984)—NATO Intelligence:
A Contradiction in Terms**

**Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK
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C O N T E N T S

Correction
Through a production error in our last issue of 2008, the title of Michael Bennett's
article on the Coast Guard's work with OSS was truncated (the word "Coast was
dropped) wherever it appeared. The title should have read: "Guardian Spies: The
US Coast Guard and OSS Maritime Operations During World War II."

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NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms

Edward B. Atkeson

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> **All is not well regarding the intelligence capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but no one quite knows what do about. (Apr 1984)**
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This article originally appeared in 1984 in Studies in Intelligence 28, no. 1. *NATO had been in existence for 35 years.* Studies *reprints the article here in conjunction with the 60th anniversary of the treaty. This redacted, unclassified version was released in April 2008, the result of a FOIA request.*

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All is not well regarding the intelligence capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but no one quite knows what to do about it. Many of us are familiar with one program or another to improve US support, but few are comfortable that they understand either the full dimensions of the problem. or why, after all these years the problem has not been solved. Study seems to follow study; task forces meet, report, and fade from view. Still the nagging criticisms persist, reflecting the glacial pace of progress and implying that much of the effort may not have been particularly useful.

What are the real problems, and why do we seem to have such difficulty in dealing with them? Why don't we have a Master Plan, with objectives and milestones and a target date for completion? Why doesn't the Alliance move forward on a common, coherent front on the matter? Why is it that officialdom seems to rediscover problems from time to time, announce programs for solution, only to end up burying the papers in files as interests move on to other, more tractable, questions?

There are many answers to these questions as we will see in the following discussion. None of them, unfortunately, is very good. Some of them indicate that if we had a better understanding of the issues and a broader sense of the relevant values we in the US might well by now have designed a much better approach to Alliance intelligence architecture and to providing the sort of support which would be useful in wartime as well as in peace.

Who's in Charge?

One of the first difficulties is the lack of clear recognition of responsibility. Many players in Washington and in the field

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The point is that there are plenty of diagnoses of NATO's intelligence ills. Our purpose is to examine the problems as objectively as we can and to draw our own conclusions.

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pursue projects aimed at incremental improvements at perceived portions of the problem, but there is little common understanding of what should be done or by whom. Many in the US Intelligence Community view the problem as essentially a European one. There is a school which holds that NATO intelligence problems, as is the case with so many of its other problems, stem primarily from the political constraints of continental governments that are not really serious about the defense of Europe. These governments, according to the critics, see their strategic options primarily in the areas of detente, deterrence (underwritten by the US), and arms control. They see but marginal need for their own aggressive intelligence surveillance of the opposition, which they seem to believe is Great Power business. Investment in intelligence systems designed primarily for support of forces in the field in wartime may be even less justifiable. If the Europeans view the utility of the Alliance as one primarily for deterrence rather than defense, they would likely see their interests best served by investment in those force elements that are most visible—not in the support components—and certainly not in provocative intelligence capabilities.

Americans who entertain this view of European proclivities believe that the initiative for NATO intelligence improvement should come from Europe. The US is doing its share they argue, the Allies should do theirs.

Not far behind this school is another American group composed of no nonsense officials with a quoting knowledge of statutes governing protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. They look askance at US initiatives to strengthen international intelligence links, suspecting that the end result will be a raid on the US' innermost secrets. For their own reasons they support those who see the NATO problem as one primarily for the Allies to solve.

Still another school concedes that the US probably has a responsibility in the matter, if only because of its position of leadership. But even within this group there are divergences. Many see the NATO intelligence problem as essentially a military one, to be resolved or managed within the Department of Defense. Those within defense tend to view it as a problem for the theater. Theater representatlves, with modest charters of authority, tend to define the scope of their efforts in the area so narrowly that a few dollars spent on an

information handling system with a terminal at a NATO headquarters passes as "progress toward intelligence support to NATO." Too few people at higher levels really understand the dimensions of the problem in any event, and those who do are hesitant to challenge nominal efforts of the field for fear of provoking accusations of meddling in theater business.

There are other schools, and undoubtedly splinter groups within them. The point is that there are plenty of diagnoses of NATO"s intelligence ills. Our purpose is to examine the problems as objectively as we can and to draw our own conclusions. We need first to understand the situation in Europe.

View from the Euro-Strategic Level

Since the establishment of NATO in 1949 it has been understood among the treaty partners that the degree of control of forces to be exercised by the supranational authority would be solely of an operational nature—and then only when the members saw fit to pass such control. Personnel, logistic, and intelligence matters have all remained official responsibilities of the member states.

There has been little difficulty with the personnel dimension. By and large the nations

themselves know their own people best, and are usually able to provide suitable officer and enlisted personnel to staff the various elements of the command structure. As long as an individual is professionally qualified for his responsibilities in his own forces and speaks either French or English he can generally find his way in NATO.

Logistics has been a somewhat different matter. While responsibility still ultimately resides with the member nations for equipping and provisioning their own forces, many compromises have been necessary to accommodate the facts of geography. Obviously, all of the nations taking part in the defense of the Central Region (and most especially the US) are dependent upon German real estate, highways, railroads, airfields, and seaports. They are also heavily dependent upon German sources of construction materials, energy, and labor. "Host nation support" has become a standard term for dealing with many questions of a logistic nature. In addition, great effort has been made within the Alliance to rationalize logistic differences among the forces and to standardize the design of materiel, procedures, and technical specifications. In sum, while far from perfect, logistics has evolved rather sensibly over the years with both national and international aspects.

> *While bilateral agreements for intelligence cooperation between parties within the Alliance have proliferated over the years, progress in the multilateral area has been elephantine.*

Intelligence has enjoyed no comparable evolution. While bilateral agreements for intelligence cooperation between parties within the Alliance have proliferated over the years, progress in the multilateral area has been elephantine. The Alliance has developed elaborate procedures for melding national intelligence contributions in peacetime, including coordinated studies, such as the annual production of "MC-161," the document presenting agreed threat information on the Warsaw Pact. There is also an array of other Military Committee papers and standardization agreements governing the handling of intelligence within the Alliance. What has not appeared in any useful form is an authoritative statement of what information the Alliance can expect to receive in a high stress, dynamic environment (such as war), where that information will come from, how it will come, or how NATO commanders can express their operational concerns to the national contributors with any expectation of receiving replies before their questions are overtaken by events.

Senior NATO officials served by American intelligence sources find themselves much better informed than their counterparts who are dependent on only that information

which the member states have revealed to NATO. General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), has commented that 90 percent of his intelligence comes to him from US sources. That leaves 10 percent for all the rest of the NATO nations combined, eloquent testimony to the great disparities in intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities between the US, on the one hand, and the rest of NATO, on the other. The US has developed global systems that the others simply cannot match. As far as intelligence is concerned, within NATO the US stands as a giant among midgets. The peculiar point is NATO's practice of treating intelligence as a national responsibility—as though each of the members could serve the needs of its own forces in war as well as in peace. Implicit in this doctrine is the very dubious proposition that the combat effectiveness of Dutch forces, for example, served by Dutch intelligence, is the best we can expect from the Netherlands. This doctrine does not address the question of what might be gained by establishing links between non-US forces and the US intelligence system. While an arrangement for bilateral sharing of intelligence at high levels has value, it is not the same as feeding operationally significant intelli-

gence directly to allied forces in the field on a time-sensitive basis.

Recently, the problem has acquired a new dimension. SACEUR has developed a concept for European defense which encompass a capability for mounting deep strikes into enemy rear areas to place follow-on Soviet and other Warsaw Fact formations at risk while hostile first echelon forces are being engaged at the border. Essential to the concept is a capacity for near real-time intelligence on second- and third-echelon dispositions and high quality links between the intelligence apparatus and appropriate deep strike units. At present the US has a virtual monopoly on means for obtaining the requisite intelligence. If the concept is to become a viable one for the Alliance, of course, the machinery must be expanded.

View from the Operational Level

General Chalupa, a German four-star officer, commands Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), stretching some 700 kilometers from the Elbe River in the north to the Austrian border in the south. Immediately subordinate to him are the Northern and Central Army

Groups (NORTHAG and CENTAG) and Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE), with its subordinate 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF). Whenever the various national force components may be "chopped" to his operational control, General Chalupa can expect to receive much of the benefits of the organic reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of those forces. He has no other intelligence collection or production assets. His battle staff includes an intelligence section, nominally large enough to perform current information assessments and to permit 24-hour operation in the field, but it is neither designed as an intelligence operating agency nor is it supported by one. General Chalupa's principal battle management functions are the allocation of forces to threatened areas, particularly with regard to the employment of reserves. The US III Corps is designed as his major tool for influencing the early phases of the battle. To accomplish these responsibilities he looks for substantive intelligence from higher and lower headquarters.

What of the higher and lower headquarters? Above is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); below (on the ground) the army groups. These headquarters benefit to a certain extent by

being one step closer to the real sources of intelligence, the national ministries of defense, on the one hand, and to the (national) corps on the other, but like HQ AFCENT, they have no intelligence support of their own. The national entities are presumed to have access to consequential intelligence support through national channels, but with certain exceptions, the headquarters of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) constitute a large network of operational nodes of control with limited capacity for determining the state of play on the potential battlefield.

The theoretical solution to the problem is the expeditious contribution of pertinent intelligence by the member states of the Alliance. In practice we find little basis for confidence that adequate attention has been paid to the needs of the operational headquarters in wartime. Remarkably, seldom have any of the members exhibited a serious sensitivity to the urgency of the wartime function.

Section redacted.

Nub of the Problem

Here we begin to approach the heart of NATO's intelligence problem-and the very point that has hobbled so many attempts at improvement over the years. Since its inception, NATO has essentially opted out of the

intelligence business. The command structure is almost totally innocent of any inherent capability for detecting or analyzing what is really going on. An almost pathetic aspect of the situation is the occasional effort by well meaning national officers to find ways to feed the very life blood of a viable defense system (intelligence) into a virtual corpse. Farther down the line, in the corps sectors of the less well endowed nations, allied forces charged with serious defensive responsi-

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Without a common intelligence system, over which it has some influence and directive authority, the Alliance is virtually doomed to drift.

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bilities have little intelligence support and no way to connect with the US system to enhance their combat effectiveness. Not only is the operational command system virtually blind, but the subordinate national entities have intelligence capabilities so varied as to promote conflicting views of the battlefield among the various national and international

headquarters. Instead of enhancing the effectiveness of the defense, the NATO intelligence system—which exists more by accident than design—seems to offer more opportunities for dysfunction than for positive support of the enterprise. Without a common intelligence system, over which it has some influence and directive authority, the Alliance is virtually doomed to drift, while a few concerned member nations—most particularly the US—seek inefficient quick fixes for treating the symptoms of a disease that, if put to the test of combat, has high probability of proving fatal.

Paragraph redacted.

   The impression we get is that while it may have made sense in the late 1940s to designate intelligence as a national responsibility because of broad similarities in intelligence gathering capabilities among the nations, the matter is much less clear today. The United States, with its global systems, backed by an intelligence budget exceeding the total defense expenditures of most of the other members, has developed systems for supporting its tactical forces that the others can never hope to match. And still they must all be prepared to fight a common enemy on a common battlefield.

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region

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Notably lacking in the scheme is any central entity or authority for coordination of the various national intelligence efforts.

Second Order Problems-View front the Tactical Level

As if these problems were not enough, we must look further to grasp the magnitude of the difficulties we create for our own forces by continued adherence to time-honored principle. The concept of national responsibility for intelligence has permeated and manifested itself in virtually all aspects of US force design, training, operations, and deployment. As pervasive as the effects of the doctrine are, we find in the field the potential for a great dilemma: either the acceptance of rigid adherence to the integrity of national formations at the corps level, which could mean collapse of a front while units of a different nationality stand idly by, or the severance of critical intelligence links to our own units whenever they are subordinated to the control of another national corps This dilemma is easily understood by a glance at the map on the preceding page, which depicts the basic scheme for the defense of the Central Region.

From north to south, corps sectors have been designated for the Netherlands, West Germany (I Corps), UK, Belgium, West Germany (III Corps), USA (V and VII Corps), and West Germany (II Corps). The West Germans also share responsi-

bility with the Danes for defense of the Schleswig-Holstein area north of the Elbe in the Allied Forces Northern Europe (APNORTH) Region. The scheme illustrates the multilateral nature of the defense and the fundamental requirement for as much homogeneity of combat effectiveness as possible across the front to minimize risks of a breakthrough in a weak sector that could lead to envelopment of all friendly forces.

Notably lacking in the scheme is any central entity or authority for coordination of the various national intelligence efforts. They are presumed to be operating in support of the national

sectors with appropriate information being fed up the chain from the corps headquarters or injected into the ACE structure from above (e.g.: from a national ministry of defense).

Section redacted.

In an extract from US Army doctrinal literature, we see the All-Source Intelligence Center System (ASICS) serving the corps and subordinate division-level headquarters tying in with other relevant US centers. There is no specific requirement for support either to the ACE structure or to allied forces responsible for the defense of other sectors. The same Alliance doctrine that designates intelligence as a

All-Source Intelligence Center System

national responsibility effectively obviates concern within the national corps for coverage of other sectors. US Army doctrine clearly reflects this in the tightly closed national system shown. While nominal allowance is made in Army manuals for providing intelligence support to combined (international) operations "in accordance with multinational agreements," there is no provision for coverage of other than US sectors, and the principal thrust is clearly inward toward national element support.

Army doctrine envisions the point of interface between national and tactical levels of intelligence at corps. This accords with the NATO concept, but it does not take into account significant dynamic pressures on the battlefield that militate for frequent mixing or cross-assignment of differing national units within the command structure. Simulations of hypothesized combat in the ACE Central Region invariably result in the assignment of US divisions and separate brigades to allied corps and vice versa. The pressures for using whatever reinforcing troops may be available (and they are usually US) to avert an enemy breakthrough invariably outweigh arguments for a tidy command structure. Units are sent where they are most urgently needed, not where they might be administratively most convenient.

Military absurdities are traditional reservoirs for humorists, but the defense of Europe is a serious subject. We need to address the problem of NATO intelligence seriously.

The awkwardness of this development is apparent. US units assigned to other than US Corps can expect to have their vital links to US national intelligence sources severed at the very moment they may need the support most acutely. Allied corps, like ACE operational headquarters, have no access to US intelligence, so amputation is virtually complete. Worse yet, most Army theater intelligence aviation units intended for providing support to tactical commanders are concentrated at the corps level. The intermingling of units across the front thus isolates these intelligence resources from many of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, the resources may be largely wasted because, while the sensor platforms continue to fly the US corps sectors, the corps themselves may be assigned allied units that have no terminals for receiving the sensor product.

We must conclude that while our Alliance doctrine rather obliges us to behave as we do, the practice of assigning US tactical intelligence aviation and the large ground mobile terminal complexes for downlink of national intelligence systems to corps level is wasteful and illogical. Absent a higher national level of control within the theater, these systems must be packed into the corps structure, sardine fashion. (More

than one humorist has compared the concentration of vehicles connected with these systems in a corps sector with patterns in the Pentagon parking lot.)

Quo Vadis? (U)

Military absurdities are traditional reservoirs for humorists, but the defense of Europe is a serious subject. We need to address the problem of NATO intelligence seriously. Whatever the political constraints and parochialisms that inhibit reform, we do ourselves little credit by prolonging our marginal attempts at symptomatic treatment. We must address the crux of the matter. This is not a narrow technical question which can be left to the generals—least particularly to those with the limited resources and policy prerogatives of field commanders. The fundamental question goes to the heart of the Alliance. Major issues of national pride, technical capacity, and strategic design are at stake. There must be reconciliation between the great differences in intelligence gathering and processing capacities of the United States and its allies that we have noted, on the one hand, with the obsolete doctrines of intelligence as a national responsibility within NATO, on the other. There must also be

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The US must find a way to provide the fruits of its intelligence system to NATO commands and to other national organizations on as expeditious a basis as it now provides them to its own forces.

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reconciliation between the needs for protection of sensitive US intelligence sources and methods and the urgency of providing the Alliance with a coherent, in-place warfighting intelligence system capable of providing the quality and level of detail necessary, on a time-sensitive basis, to all echelons of force control, from the lowest maneuver elements to the highest authorities. The mechanisms must stretch laterally from the North Cape of Norway to the eastern provinces of Turkey, and cover the territories of the Warsaw Pact to the east and the seas westward to the shores of the North American continent. This is no undertaking for the faint hearted or the parochial bureaucrat. It calls for imagination, patience, and perseverance.

Where to start? Central Europe. This is the stage of ultimate decision for the Alliance. As systems and procedures are established and developed for the AFCENT region, they should be extended outward to encompass the entirety of the Alliance. Each step should be undertaken in consultation with the affected allies so that the greatest operational compatibilities are achieved. We must bear in mind that intelligence is a support service—not an end in itself. It is not like postage stamp collecting where

the object is the assembly of "full sets." The object in intelligence is to provide that specific information the commander requires at the time he requires it so that he can realize the maximum value from his forces. As a support activity, it must be functionally subordinate—responsive—to the field commanders. Higher commanders, regardless of nationality, must have the authority to designate priorities among competing subordinates. If, in General Chalupa's opinion, the most critical sector is held by the Dutch, that is the area that should be given highest priority. We must recognize that in the final analysis it is in the US' own best interest that the defense succeed. It is futile to ensure the defense of Bavaria under an American flag if the rest of the NATO line crumbles for lack of capability to detect and to properly interpret the rapidly changing threat.

None of this is to say that the US must suddenly go public with its most sensitive sources and methods. What it does mean is that the US must find a way to provide the fruits of its intelligence system to NATO commands and to other national organizations on as expeditious a basis as it now provides them to its own forces. By solemn treaty the US has identified its most cogent

national interests with the security of Western Europe. It makes little sense to withhold vital intelligence of direct relevance to the success of the battle from allied commanders endeavoring to achieve the same objectives as we have set for our own.

Of course, we are primarily concerned here with conditions of emergency or war—far less particularly with practices in peacetime. However, in order for the physical collection means, the communications systems, the trained analytical staffs and the facilities they require for operation to be in place in emergency or war, they must be designed, programmed, budgeted, and installed in peacetime. Further, they must be exercised to develop their efficiency and to familiarize non-US NATO staffs with the products so that exploitation can be a matter of course and not a curiosity. Dummy loads can usually accomplish almost as much for exercise purposes as can the flow of actual data. A network of small US intelligence support detachments with appropriate mobile or hardened comunications linking them with the US intelligence system could provide intelligence support to non-US headquarters just as US nuclear warhead custodial detachments do in the field today to allied artillery and missile units. The establishment of the communications and coordinative means for accomplishment of the intel-

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A more effective organization could be achieved by …in effect creating a NATO intelligence command.

ligence function should never be confused with laxity in the protection of significant details of the operation itself. Properly constituted, US intelligence support detachments, interfacing with relevant US intelligence fusion nodes and activities, could serve all levels of NATO and its subordinate non-US national commands without necessarily revealing details of sensitive sources or methods of intelligence operations.

A significant point must be emphasized with regard to the operational control of the organization. At each level of command the supporting intelligence detachment must be responsive to the priorities and interests of the commander, regardless of his nationality. As a whole, the organization must conform to the operational focus of the NATO force. We cannot, for example, allow the desires of a US corps commander to override those of his superiors at army group or HQ AFCENT. Each commander with responsibility for battle management must have the authority to establish priorities and to focus reconnaissance effort within his area as he sees fit. The national identity of a commander should not be the criterion by which intelligence support is assigned or withheld.

The simplest way to attain this responsiveness and conformity with the operational effort would be to subordinate the overall American intelligence structure in the theater (less those units organic to front line brigades and divisions) to NATO control. Intelligence assets with capacities for general support to the entire region should be liberated from the straitjacket of corps-level assignment and distributed and employed as is most expedient from the theater perspective. A senior US intelligence official should exercise command over all of the assets thus made available and should deploy them in accordance with the desires of the ACE commander. General Rogers, as SACEUR (not as Commander-in-Chief USEUCOM) should have full control, with authority to set priorities within the AFCENT Region. General Chalupa's concerns should determine the operational tasking of units.

A more effective organization could be achieved by operationally linking the corresponding intelligence activities of the other NATO nations with the US theater structure, in effect creating a NATO intelligence command. Ideally, the components would develop common working procedures and sufficient familiarity with each other's capabilities as to permit easy transformation to an operational support role in time of war. Whether this is politically possible at this juncture is unclear; in any event, there should be no hesitancy in reconfiguring the major player—the US element—to meet the immediate demand for a basic intelligence support system.

As we proceed, we must be sensitive to the perceptions of our allies so that we do not crate false images of a US "takeover" of NATO intelligence. The fact of the matter is quite the other way around. In a sense we are advocating a NATO "takeover" of US intelligence, with wartime direction emanating from ACE operational commanders rather than from US administrative headquarters. This may be a difficult concept for some to grasp, particularly at political levels, where peacetime threat and indications and warning information tend to be fuzzed with political interests. At such levels the effort probably could be explained most effectively as a peacetime precaution to ensure wartime effectiveness, thereby contributing to deterrence and reducing the chances that the Alliance could be perceived by the opposition as a sham, an incoherent coagulation of military forces that are fundamentally blind on the battlefield.

Experiments have been made over the years in efforts to bring about a sensible use of the great American intelligence capabilities for support to tactical commanders. Unfortu-

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The core problem is deeply embedded in decades of custom and practice and will not easily be overcome.

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nately, as we have seen, too many of the efforts have been poorly focused, inadequately conceived, and relegated to officials too low on the policy ladder. The matter is now becoming even more urgent as we enter the era of greater reliance on prompt battlefield intelligence to "see deep" and to strike simultaneously with front line and deep strike units.

We need a much better understanding of the problems at all levels, and we need relief from obsolete doctrine. It is not a task for any single level of responsibility. In the US Government there should be a National Security Council senior interdepartmental group (SIG) to formulate policy an NATO intelligence matters and to coordinate the efforts of the various agencies end departments on the subject. At NATO, the US Mission and the Senior US Representative to the NATO Military Committee should be focal points for reshaping NATO doctrine on intelligence to secure Alliance understanding and cooperation in the development of a viable warfighting support intelligence system.

Within the US Department of Defense there necessarily will be a redefinition of past guidance to the services to clarify responsibilities for intelligence support to the Alliance. The Department of Defense will have to work closely with the Department of State to resolve "burden sharlng" issues with the allies. If the US is to pick up responsibilities for virtually all operational intelligence for the Alliance in wartime it should be compensated by relief in other areas. Tradeoffs should be designed that will increase the overall strength of the common defense.

US military service programs and budgets will be affected, and some priorities will require reordering in order to fit the new concept. Service agencies for doctrinal development and equipment research and development will also require much more specific guidance in order to fulfill their roles in the effort. The need for appropriate force training exercises and professional education of the officer corps will also have to be taken into account.

The core problem is deeply embedded in decades of custom and practice and will not easily be overcome. Nevertheless, if we are sincere in our oft-repeated protestations about a search for a viable conventional warfighting capability in Europe, we must soon get to the heart of the matter and put the critical intelligence component of that capability in order.

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Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999

Miron Varouhakis

> **The Greeks exposed the ineffectiveness of their intelligence apparatus, which violated numerous fundamentals of intelligence tradecraft.**

In 1999 Greece's National Intelligence Agency (EYP) conducted a high-risk operation that ended in a debacle and strained its relations with the United States, Turkey, and other nations. The operation was an effort to transfer Abdullah Ocalan, the fugitive founding leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), from Greece to a country in Africa to avoid his capture by Turkish authorities. Athens's plan was to hide Ocalan in the Greek embassy in Nairobi until he could be transferred to another location. Army Major Savvas Kalenteridis, an EYP officer, was assigned to escort Ocalan to his destination. Instead, his actions in Nairobi not only failed to keep Ocalan from his pursuers but led to an international flap and ended several careers, eventually including his own. In the process, the Greeks exposed the ineffectiveness of their intelligence apparatus, which violated numerous fundamentals of intelligence tradecraft.

This account of events was compiled from press reports, leaked official Greek government documents, testimony given during a trial in 2003 of those who illegally brought Ocalan into Greece in 1999 and precipitated this misadventure.

By 1999, Abdullah Ocalan had become the world's most prominent Kurdish figure and a fugitive driven out of several countries. Born in 1948 in the village of Omerli in southeastern Turkey, Ocalan became politically active during his college years and founded the PKK in 1974.

Ocalan's vision, rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, was to set up an independent Kurdish state by waging an armed struggle against Turkey. The first shots of this conflict were fired in 1984, but it continues even now, having claimed, by some estimates, about 44,000 lives.

Since the PKK's formation, Turkey has formally declared the group a terrorist organization, a stance adopted by the United States, the European Union, and much of the international community. Ocalan became an international fugi-

tive since about 1980, when he fled to Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, where he set up his PKK headquarters. He was driven from Syria under international pressure and has sought safe haven in Italy, Russia, and Greece, where he arrived with two female aides on 29 January 1999. The group had been spirited out of St. Petersburg, Russia, on a private plane hired by a retired Greek Navy officer, a long-time friend of Ocalan's.[a]

The Greek Intelligence Mission

Ocalan's secret and unsanctioned arrival in Greece set off a scramble in the Greek government, which sought to avoid the regional and international repercussions of harboring Turkey's most wanted fugitive before knowledge of his presence became public. To deal with him, the government called on the EYP. After quickly contemplating several scenarios, Athens decided to fly Ocalan and his aides, escorted by intelligence officer Savvas Kalenteridis, to Kenya and on to South Africa, where it hoped to negotiate asylum for him.

The Greek-registered Falcon jet carrying the Ocalan group, including Kalenteridis, landed in Nairobi at 1100 on 2 February. The day before,

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[a] According to press reports, Ocalan believed the Turks had arranged an assassination attempt to be carried out by a Russian underworld group.

Vassilis Papaioanou, a senior aide to Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, had informed the secretary of the embassy in Nairobi that the Falcon would arrive with important passengers. On the following day the passengers arrived—Ocalan traveling with a falsified passport with the name of a prominent Cypriot journalist, and alleged PKK sympathizer, Lazaros Mavros. On its arrival, the group was taken to the residence of Ambassador Georgios Costoulas.

The following day, Papaioanou called again, this time to inform Ambassador Costoulas that from then on any communication with the foreign minister's office could only be conducted by telephone. At this point, Kalenteridis revealed his government's complete plan. He explained that his orders were to depart for South Africa as soon as possible to make arrangements for Ocalan's asylum and to obtain a valid passport for him. Ocalan was to remain in the custody of the embassy until the arrangements were complete.

A busy Thursday, the 4th, began with a early call from an officer of the US embassy in Nairobi seeking to arrange a meeting with the ambassador on Friday.[b] Soon after, Costoulas was summoned to the Ken-

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[b] Whether that meeting took place or not is unclear, and the subject of it was never revealed, although its timing implies knowledge of the embassy's predicament.

yan Foreign Ministry where he was questioned about the Falcon and its passengers. At about the same time, Kenyan authorities in Nairobi's airport detained and questioned Kalenteridis, who was about to board a flight to South Africa. Forced to miss his flight, Kalenteridis returned to the official residence.

Ocalan's picture on a passport bearing the identification of a prominent Cypriot journalist.

On Friday, the 5th, the Kenyan government intensified its queries about the passengers of the Falcon. A nervous Costoulas called back to Athens for instructions, and Papaioanou told him to "act like a shepherd and whistle indifferently" to the questions of the Kenyan authorities. Later on that same day, Papaioanou switched gears and instructed the ambassador to tell Ocalan that "he needs to be removed from the national [Greek] colors."

When the ambassador asked where Ocalan should go,

"Tell him to go on a safari. Tell him to go wherever he likes. He should stay away from [Greek] national colors."

Papaioanou told him "The big singer [Pangalos] is upset. We did a favor. They shouldn't make us regret it. Tell him to go on a safari. Tell him to go wherever he likes. He should stay away from [our] national colors." When Costoulas and Kalenteridis suggested transferring Ocalan to a UN building in Nairobi, where he could ask for asylum, Papaioanou rebuffed them and continued to insist on Ocalan's removal from "national colors."

Citing fear for his life, Ocalan, rejected the eviction order and instead filed a written request for political asylum with the Greek government. As the pressure from Athens for his removal intensified, the women Ocalan had brought with him threatened to set themselves on fire in the embassy garden.[c] Cowed, embassy members contemplated alternative escape scenarios over the next few days.

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[c] One press report claimed at least one woman was armed and threatened to use her pistol to commit suicide.

The standoff continued into Friday, 12 February, when it became clear that Kalenteridis was not helping his government's cause. On that day, the chief of EYP, Haralambos Stavrakakis, called Kalenteridis and pleaded with him to kick Ocalan out of the residence: "Tell him to get out right away and to go wherever he wants. We didn't promise him anything. Kick him out, Savvas, so we can finish with this. I am begging you, my child!" Kalenteridis refused the order.

The next day, Ocalan's Greek lawyer arrived in Nairobi. Ocalan still had no valid passport and no fresh plans for departure to a new destination. After consulting with his lawyer, Ocalan insisted, unsuccessfully, that even if Greece rejected his application for asylum, the Greek government had an obligation to prosecute him in accordance with international law.

Again, Stavrakakis called Kalenteridis and ordered him to remove Ocalan from the embassy, by force if necessary. Kalenteridis again refused, saying he could not do it for practical reasons. Not long after, Kalenteridis received still another call from EYP headquarters, this time from someone by the name of Michalis. "Savvas listen to me, I am Tzovaras and present are three

A Failed Escape Effort

"The careers of three ministers are on the line because of your actions, do you understand that? You should go and remove him [Ocalan] by force at once."

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ministers and the chief. The careers of three ministers are on the line because of your actions, do you understand that? You should go and remove him [Ocalan] by force at once."[d]

Kalenteridis refused yet again, saying he was unable to use force. Tzovaras continued to plead with him. "I am begging you, Savvas, throw him out so we can finish with this. You can do this. Be careful, because if you don't do this when you come back they will discharge you. You can do this. There are three ministers here…"

Kalenteridis, unmoved, refused again, his fourth refusal into the mission. Only then did the government in Athens decide to dispatch a four-member EYP security team to enforce its orders. This development was conveyed to Ambassador Costoulas by the EYP and Papaioanou at the Foreign Ministry, who informed him that a "theatrical group, a football team" would be arriving the next day, which if necessary "will play ball."

On Sunday, the 14th, at 1300, the security team reached the residence, having been briefly detained and questioned by Kenyan authorities at the airport. The agents realized they were under surveillance by Kenyan and other foreign agents. A couple of hours before the EYP officers arrived at the Greek embassy, the secretary of the embassy received a call from Papaioanou at the Foreign Ministry, who asked him to take detailed notes as he provided new directions. These, he warned, were to be followed to the letter:

• The "football team" will have instructions to act fast, and if necessary by force.

• The grandmother (Ocalan) is to be removed immediately.

• A room for him should be booked at a local hotel.

• He was to be given a little bit of money if necessary.

• He was to be taken to a location near the hotel, even if wrapped in a bed sheet.

• He and his associates were to be abandoned and any communication with him ended at that point.

• Everything had to be finished by Monday, the next day.

And finished it was, but apparently not as the Greeks had intended—at least not as Kalenteridis had intended. On Monday, 15 February, Costoulas was summoned to the Kenyan Foreign Ministry and told that the Kenyan government knew Ocalan was hiding at the residence. Costoulas was offered an aircraft for a swift departure to a country of Ocalan's choosing. Contacted, Foreign Minister Pangalos accepted the Kenyan offer and agreed to remove Ocalan within the two-hour window the Kenyans provided.

Athens asked for details about the aircraft and its flight plan but was rebuffed. The Kenyan government also refused to permit the Greeks to use their embassy car—sovereign territory—to take Ocalan to the airport, insisting instead that Kenyan government cars be used. After intense negotiations in the embassy, Ocalan boarded a Kenyan government vehicle—without his aides and without any Greek official. He was driven to the airport and placed on a waiting plane, where Turkish agents seized, shackled, gagged, and blindfolded him.[e] He was returned to Turkey and put on trial that year.

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[d] In May 1999, Stavrakakis, Tzovaras—identified as a senior counterterrorism official—and three other Greek security officials were "sentenced" to death by a Kurdish "popular court" for their roles in Ocalan's capture. Kalenteridis was acquitted.

[e] The Turks videotaped the capture aboard the plane and broadcast it soon after Ocalan was on Turkish soil.

What went wrong for the Greeks?

Athens' neglect of important operational considerations doomed the effort virtually from the start.

Whatever the political foundations of the decision to take Ocalan to Kenya, Athens' neglected important operational considerations, dooming the effort virtually from the start.

The objectives of the EYP's mission were clear enough:

• Kalenteridis and his team were to take Ocalan to a temporary secure location outside of Greece from which Ocalan could find permanent refuge elsewhere.

• The mission was to proceed in a way that no other country would know that Greece was harboring and helping Ocalan.

• Ocalan was to be protected from any agents seeking to seize him and transfer him to Turkey.

Those objectives would fall victim to international pressure, as we have seen, but in all probability the operation was compromised very soon after it began, and the Greeks should have known it.

The decision to take Ocalan to Kenya was a poor one. As the theater in which this operation was to be carried out, Kenya was inappropriate for several reasons, the most important of which was the fact that just less than six months before, the US embassy there had been bombed by al Qa'ida, and numerous US officials were likely to have been investigating the scene. In addition, Kenyan authorities would most likely have been on high alert and, even if they were not, they were unlikely to have been helpful in any effort that might have implied support for a declared terrorist like Ocalan.

According to EYP chief Stavrakakis, Foreign Minister Pangalos initially wanted to transfer Ocalan to Holland, but the attempt failed because Dutch authorities refused landing rights because a large crowd of Kurds had gathered at the airport. Pangalos later claimed that the EYP had suggested Kenya as a way station while negotiations with South Africa took place. Given the circumstances in Nairobi and the many alternative locations around the world housing Greek diplomatic facilities, the EYP's choice is puzzling.

The tradecraft of the EYP and other components of the Greek government were exceedingly lax. Members of the organization paid inadequate attention to communications security, counterintelligence, protection of sources and methods, as well as threats to the security of the personnel involved in the mission.

Given the Dutch experience, conditions in the Kenya, and the intense interest in Ocalan around the world, there was every reason to believe Ocalan's movements were being tracked. Leaked documents indicate that both the Turkish and US governments knew Ocalan was in Greece and knew when he was transferred to Kenya. The documents show that the Turkish embassy in Athens made an inquiry to the Greek Foreign Ministry while Ocalan was still in Athens; in addition, the request of the US embassy in Kenya for a meeting with ambassador mentioned above also implied knowledge of the situation.

Embassy communications practices most likely contributed to compromises. The most critical field communications of the operation, specifically from EYP headquarters in Athens, took place entirely by telephone— even payphones. Codenames like "grandmother" (Ocalan), "big singer" (Pangalos), and "football team" (team of intelligence officers) were inadequate to provide a layer of security to communications. Moreover, not everyone was addressed with a codename. The lead field agent, Kalenteridis, was always addressed by his given name, according to the leaked documents.

Finally, the physical security of Ocalan, his aides, and the escorting team was inadequate.

Kalenteridis's selection to head the Ocalan mission brought distinct advantages…. At the same time, there should have been suspicions about his suitability for the sensitive mission.

As Stavrakakis later noted, the Public Order Ministry had provided too few security personnel for the mission, even leaving them unarmed.

The chain of command was broken as senior officials of ministry rank became intimately involved in the operation. Testimony during the 2003 trial and leaked Greek government reports make clear that ministerial rank officials were involved in the macro- and micro-management of the operation. Such breakdowns in the routine chain of command can signal failings in authority above; create uncertainty in the field; and permit, or force, field operators to question and even challenge their orders, especially when a core mission has changed so clearly and rapidly.

After involving itself in Ocalan's relocation, selection of Kalenteridis to lead the mission was the Greeks' most critical error. A qualified selection to head an autonomous operation such as this one would ideally have the knowledge and expertise appropriate to the nature and location of the mission. These include fluency in specific foreign languages, knowledge of specific cultures and locations, and so on. These, on the surface at least, Kalenteridis had.

Kalenteridis was born in 1960 in the small town of Vergi near the northern Greek city of Serres. His family had its origins in an ethnic Greek community on the Black Sea, known to Greeks as *Euxeinos Pontos* (Hospitable Sea). Like most Greeks whose families were repatriated from faraway places, Kalenteridis was raised to respect, admire, and honor Greece's history and heritage. Vergi is a historic place, home to several ancient ruins of the archaic era (800–500 BCE). Moreover, the town is not far from Greece's northern border with Bulgaria, an area that traditionally has had strong nationalist sentiments.

Kalenteridis excelled in school, and in 1977 his high marks earned him entrance to the Evelpidon Military Academy, Greece's top military academy. Kalenteridis graduated in 1981 with the rank of second lieutenant. He went on to serve in several tank and paratroop units in Greece and in posts abroad. At one time he was a military attaché in Izmir, Turkey. His fluency in Turkish and knowledge of foreign affairs made him an asset to the National Intelligence Agency, for which Kalenteridis worked covertly for several years, mainly in Turkey.

Kalenteridis's selection to head the Ocalan mission brought distinct advantages: his expertise in Turkish affairs, his fluency in the language, and his knowledge from past service as an EYP agent in Turkey. At the same time, there should have been suspicions about his suitability for the sensitive mission.

First, his superiors might have considered his family's roots and the tradition of nationalism it implied, even if Kalenteridis himself had never expressed them openly.[f] More pointedly, EYP officials later revealed they knew that in December 1998, just a month before Ocalan arrived, Kalenteridis had been in Rome acting as the interpreter in a meeting Ocalan had with Panagiotis Sgouridis, a vice chairman of the Greek Parliament. The task apparently had not been assigned or sanctioned by the EYP.

During the same period, EYP chief Stavrakakis received a tip that Ocalan might be brought to Greece in late January 1999. It was at that point, EYP Espionage Division Director Col. P. Kitsos told his superiors that he had concluded that a component of EYP was operating autonomously and that officers in that component were prone to disobey official government orders.

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[f] Indeed, in 2002 a Turkish commentator accused Kalenteridis of involvement in separatist-related activity in his ancestral region, activity the writer also linked to PKK propaganda.

Athens may not have emerged unscathed from this episode even if Kalenteridis had done as he had been told. In the end, his refusals extended the problem and magnified the fiasco in Nairobi.

In this operation, Kalenteridis apparently overrode his government's and his intelligence service's interests—as the Greeks would say, "He was wearing two hats." Kalenteridis has never publicly explained his position, but we know his obligations: He had taken an oath to serve and protect his country and it was not his position to pass judgment on the political, diplomatic, and intelligence matters that drove the changes in his mission. He should have obeyed his orders.

Athens may not have emerged unscathed from this episode even if Kalenteridis had done as he had been told. But in the end, his refusals extended the problem and magnified the fiasco in Nairobi, led to the embarrassment of his government, added new strains in relations with Turkey and the United States, and fueled the wrath of Kurds worldwide.

Epilogue: Three cabinet members and the chief of the EYP resigned soon after Ocalan's seizure. Kalenteridis would himself resign a year later. Ocalan was tried in 1999 in a Turkish court and sentenced to death. The penalty was reduced to life in prison in 2002 after Turkey abolished the death penalty. He has been serving his sentence in solitary confinement on the prison island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara off northwestern Turkey.

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The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq.

John M. Diamond: Stanford University Press, 2008, 536 p., photos, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Roger Z. George

Rising above the "gotcha" or the "connect the dots" simplicity of the growing genre of "intelligence-failure" literature, John Diamond's *The CIA and the Culture of Failure* is one book of the genre worth reading if one is all you choose to read. While the title is off-putting and misleading, Diamond explains it early in a way that compelled this reviewer to see if the author could make his case. The former *Chicago Tribune* and *USA Today* reporter on national security asserts in his introduction that "failure refers not to alleged CIA incompetence, which, though it occurs in cases we will explore, is often overstated by the agency's critics." What he explores instead is the product of an "atmosphere of declining confidence in the abilities of U.S. intelligence to do its job." Hence, the fault lies not only in the Agency's performance but in US politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union began in 1989.

Diamond spent two years piecing together his story from information released in the Agency's declassification programs, congressional hearings, commission postmortems, policymaker memoirs, and interviews with former Agency officials. He does not attempt to cover the Agency's entire history or to deal with every issue or controversy in which CIA has been involved since 1991. He says very little, for example, about collection or covert operations. One exception is a chapter on Aldrich Ames in which Diamond tries to demonstrate how Ames put CIA "in Chapter 11," in the words of former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin. In his many sources, he detects a steady decline in CIA's status and performance.

The book unfolds in a discussion of the CIA's analytic record on the fall of the Soviet Union, which Diamond links to later problems in CIA's analysis on terrorism and Iraq. Like other authors, he acknowledges the shock of the loss of CIA's main target and object of analysis, but unlike other Agency critics, he does not entirely blame the Agency for not predicting the USSR's fall. "In a sense," he writes, "the CIA set itself up for later failures of analysis by its occasionally prescient early 1980s assessments of the pressures toward radical change in the Soviet bloc." He credits CIA for forecasting the risks—including coup plotting—Mikhail Gorbachev ran in trying to right the sinking ship of socialism. However, the Agency never fully appreciated the centrifugal forces at play in Soviet society

and consequently could not anticipate or appreciate the far-reaching proposals that Gorbachev was to lay down in the late 1980s.

Rather than leave it at that, Diamond makes an observation few other critics acknowledge, namely, that analysis is not just about prediction. As he puts it:

> *The scorn heaped on the Agency in the early 1990s—scorn that had a significant and damaging impact on intelligence spending at what we now know was a critical time in the emergence of militant Islam—is based on the dubious assumption that predicting the breakup should have been an easy call.*

The Soviet breakup, he notes, involved both a complicated set of events in that society and significant interactions with the United States. Hence, he believes that "getting it right in the case of the Soviet breakup, required foresight about shifts in U.S. and Soviet policy as well as the interaction between those shifts." Debates raged throughout the Reagan era over the proper way to deal with, if not bring down, the Soviet Union. CIA's place, according to Diamond, "was somewhere in the middle." It wrote about structural economic flaws but consistently overestimated Soviet GNP, it accurately gauged many Soviet military programs but undervalued the overall strain defense placed on the economy, and it identified the falling quality of life as a major threat to stability but never questioned Moscow's ability to control the pressures. Diamond asserts that CIA followed its natural instinct to find a middle course between hawks and doves. The result satisfied no one, and CIA lost its credibility. In the end, "neither the political left nor right in America had a particular interest in defending the CIA against the charge of intelligence failure."

This description of CIA's political plight after 1989 sets the stage for the chapters on 9/11 and the Iraq War. In them Diamond asserts that CIA analysis often tacked within the confines of a supercharged political environment in which every estimative misjudgment or mistaken analysis had its predictable and often overcompensating adjustment. In many cases, CIA was judged to be changing its analytic course, flipping assumptions on their heads, or learning the next lesson in a way that guaranteed a future failure. Diamond also notes that much of the fault for this zig-zagging is driven by the shifting priorities and preoccupations of the policymakers CIA serves. "Intelligence reporting, in no small degree, reflects less the views of analysts than the view implied by questions policymakers have asked those analysts to answer." So, if the first Bush administration showed no interest in Iraq prior its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, CIA was prone not to focus on it or to develop good sources; likewise when "containment" was thought to be working against Iraq during the Clinton administration, there was little incentive for CIA to develop sources or focus on what was not known about Baghdad's WMD programs. Along the way, Diamond applauds CIA for getting many things right and for trying to warn inattentive policymakers.

Stepping back from the argument itself, Diamond's account of the CIA's post-1989 analytic record deftly describes the interaction of intelligence with policy, making it a far more sophisticated and well-sourced treatment than many published critiques. Even though the *Culture of Failure* does not presume to be comprehensive in examining the many issues CIA has had on its plate since 1989, those who actually worked on the issues will have to admire Diamond's attention to detail, his meticulous sequencing of events, and his placement of events into their political contexts.

No doubt, practitioners aware of still-classified material will quibble with some details or inferences and conclusions, but most will still find the volume a handy update to Christopher Andrew's book, *For the President's Eyes Only,* which does not cover the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.

But does Diamond's core thesis, his quasi-deterministic view of CIA's "culture of failure," hold up on full reading? I am not convinced. First, like many books in the "failure" genre, this one suffers from hindsight bias. The author finds that certain events—once all the facts are known—seem so much clearer than they could have been at the time.[1] No analyst, and perhaps only a few senior Intelligence Community managers, could possibly have had the "bigger picture" in mind when formulating hypotheses about the Soviet Union, Bin Laden, or Iraq. Analysts stay in their lanes, and, for reasons of analytic integrity, tend not to put themselves in the policymakers' position of understanding how their analyses will affect policy or how their analyses will be perceived by a particular policymaker. To blame analysts for tailoring their work to fit what policymakers might think is acceptable or credible is unfair, attributing to them insight most are unlikely to have. In any case, the thesis cannot explain why CIA and the Intelligence Community could get the Iraq WMD story so wrong but got its assessments of an alleged al-Qaeda–Iraq linkage and a post-Saddam Iraq so right. Uneven analytic expertise and rigor is a likelier explanation.[2]

Second, Diamond seems to imply that "lessons learned" from one analytic experience are transmitted seamlessly to other analytic units. His argument that the Agency's damaged reputation after the fall of the Berlin Wall haunted its terrorism analysis and later its analysis of Iraq WMD may sound plausible in the abstract, but is too simplistic. Very few analysts and managers who lived through the Reagan-era intelligence-policy disputes over the Soviet Union were working the terrorism or Iraq issues. So, somehow this "culture of failure" had to be transplanted in the younger generation of analysts who came to populate the DI in the 1990s. Yet, there is no evidence in the book that any terrorism analyst or weapons analyst had such lessons in mind when they examined their particular targets. Moreover, both in-house and outside critiques of the Agency's performance on the Iraq WMD issue fault analysts for not having learned earlier lessons—that is, they committed the same sort of cognitive errors made by earlier analysts during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1973 Middle East War, the 1979 Iran Revolution, and indeed the fall of the Soviet Union. So, how can Diamond conclude that a past era had such a dramatic impact on a more recent one?

Third, despite Diamond's claim that prediction is not the sole metric of the Agency's performance, virtually all of his book seems to focus on whether the Agency's forecasts were more correct than not. Again, this simplifies the role of analysis to a game of odds-making. Like other critics, he dismisses or plays down the role of uncertainty in the analytic process; that is, analysts often must warn

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[1] Diamond notes the second-guessing game that scholars play with analysis once more is known. He writes: "Given the huge volume of CIA analysis of the Soviet Union now available to the public through declassification, it is easy for a scholar to find examples of intelligence analysis that make the Agency look either brilliant or foolish, depending on the scholar's predisposition." (89)

[2] Diamond notes that CIA basically stood its ground on the lack of persuasive evidence for al-Qaeda links to Saddam and wrote two very prescient Intelligence Community assessments on the domestic and regional consequences of Saddam's fall. (417–19)

policymakers less about the certainty of a bad outcome and more about the uncertainty surrounding any judgment about the future. This is unsatisfying for policymakers but essential if analysts are to provide objective and transparent judgments. If, in 1987, CIA had predicted the end of the Soviet Union by the end of the decade, would anyone have listened? Exactly such a prediction was made regarding the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1990—which he does not examine—and had almost no impact on the first Bush administration. Analytic certitude does not guarantee an impact on policy, but raising the possibility of deeper change, as CIA did in its many analyses of the Soviet Union, at least prepares policymakers to hedge bets in dealing with uncertain futures. Had Diamond considered this uncertainty factor, he might well have arrived at different conclusions regarding the agency's performance or continued relevance. Indeed, he might have shifted more responsibility to the policymakers' side of the score sheet.

Fourth and finally, one wishes a seasoned journalist who has followed national security and intelligence policy for more than 20 years would have made an effort to address the media's contribution to the post-9/11 political environment. Was not the media part of the zeitgeist in which CIA became the whipping boy for failed policies? And in his discussion of the Iraq WMD story, should Diamond not have at least mentioned how readily prominent journalists bought into the mindset that Saddam had WMD and was cleverer than we all thought?[3] If he is correct in arguing that analysts felt the burden of declining credibility over the years since 1989, at least part of that culture of failure was being transmitted by a press that found it appealing to focus on the Agency's failings more than its successes. Unlike this book, which acknowledges the difficulty of assessing the full record, the media have painted intelligence in black and white—either tainted by politicization or irrelevant to critical national decisions, when the truth lies elsewhere.

Despite these flaws, the book makes an important contribution by highlighting the inherently inseparable nature of policy and the intelligence work behind it. Neither operates in a vacuum, and policymakers and intelligence officers work better when they understand and acknowledge the impact they have on each other. Wisely, Diamond states, "there is no bright line between success and failure, no column of intelligence activities on one side labeled 'successes' and another on the other side labeled 'failures.'" Thankfully, Diamond offers no over-simplified silver bullet as a solution to this intelligence-policy problem. Nor does he offer much hope for improvement for the future. Indeed, he acknowledges that the themes he examines— "the politicization of intelligence, the error-prone nature of the business, the tendency of bureaucracies to stumble into new kinds of failure while striving to avoid repeating past mistakes" —are not unique to the period after the Soviet Union or to intelligence. More somberly, he sees and expects the gap between policy and intelligence to widen. In providing this judgment, he performs the useful function of cautioning future administrations that they need to work on making this relationship as transparent and collaborative as possible. His message is that using the CIA to justify future actions, or excuse past mistakes, inevitably makes the Agency less effective and ultimately can undermine the nation's security.

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[3] The *New York Times* acknowledged the media could have done a better job in challenging the prevailing view of Saddam and might have challenged journalists, especially Judith Miller and Michael Gordon, to scrutinize their own work, which was based on insider information. See "The Times and Iraq," *New York Times*, 26 May 2004.

Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service

Frederic Wakeman, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, 650 pp. Photos, index.

Reviewed by Bob Bergin

Spymaster is a rich, but very complex book, difficult to read in places, but rewarding for the reader willing to struggle through the difficult parts. It tells the story of Dai Li, "an extraordinary secret policeman," and of the immense espionage apparatus he built. More importantly, in detailing American involvement with Dai Li, the story offers a lesson, relevant today, in the nature of intelligence relationships between allies, how wrong they can go, and how the OSS deftly handled a relationship gone bad.

Dai Li was Chiang Kai-shek's spymaster during World War II, "the claws and teeth" of the Chinese Nationalist leader and the "Chinese Himmler" to the British. As chief of the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the Military Affairs Commission or *Juntong*, he controlled tens of thousands of spies in China and in every country that had a Chinese community. Official sources claim that Dai Li had 100,000 agents in the field by 1945. "There were 50,000 regular agents running assets, amounting to about 500,000 spies and informers, making the Juntong the world's largest espionage organization at the time." Aimed primarily at Chiang's political enemies and the communists, the Juntong carried out "all kinds of espionage and intelligence work."

Dai Li was a natural for the job: his was the classic rise from obscurity to great power through cunning, intelligence, and deviousness. He was born in 1897 in the hills of Zhejiang Province, where even as a teenager he was seen as a natural leader, but also as "a trouble maker addicted to sex and gambling." Caught cheating at cards, he ran off to join the army, and then deserted—but not before he connected with the Green Gang, the notorious gangsters who controlled the Shanghai underworld. It was a link that would serve him well in times to come.

In 1921, while "living off the land" in Shanghai, he met Chiang Kai-shek and ran errands for him. In 1926, possibly with Green Gang help, he managed to get admitted to the Whampoa Military Academy, where Chiang was the chancellor. To ingratiate himself with Chiang, who wanted to use him as a batman, he reported on the ideological purity of his fellow cadets. The ones he identified as communists were eliminated in a purge at Whampoa in 1927.

Whampoa and its alumni were the base on which Chiang's power was built. His loyalists moved in a swirl of associations, secret societies, and front organizations. At the core was the most secret *Lixingshe* (the Society for Vigorous Practice) and the front organization it controlled, the *Fuxingshe*, or Renaissance Society. Permeating the mix was Chiang's personal espionage apparatus of secret intelligence organizations that he let fight among themselves for funds and authority.

In 1928, Chiang established a 10-man intelligence unit called the Liaison Group and put Dai Li in charge. Later called the "embryo of all subsequent party and state military intelligence organizations," the group had to compete with many others. To strengthen his hand, Dai Li formed the "League of Ten," Wampoa graduates he put on his private payroll who became the core of his personal "secret service."

In 1932, when Chiang needed intelligence that others were unable to provide, he directed Dai Li to turn his League of Ten into a formal Special Services Department. The Ten became more than a hundred, and Dai Li's rise began. Dai Li became Chiang's primary source for political intelligence, and, in 1938, Chiang established the new independent security agency that was the Juntong. Dai Li was made its chief.

Before the outbreak of war with Japan, Dai's activities centered on Shanghai, where he suborned the police and drew on the skills of his associates in the Green Gang. Kidnapping and torture became tools to gather intelligence and root out Chiang's enemies and the communists. Trafficking in narcotics and other contraband was the means to supplement budgets as Dai Li's activities and power grew. Dai Li was the only man allowed armed into Chiang's presence. He became the most feared man in China; mothers invoked his name to make their children behave.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans started streaming into China, some with big ideas for winning the war and access to the funds to do it. Dai had never taken well to foreigners and avoided dealing with them. Then he met a US Navy officer open to his ideas. Commander Milton E. Miles, known to history as "Mary" Miles, was the nearest thing the US Navy had to a China expert. A graduate of the Naval Academy, he had spent five years with the Asiatic fleet. In early 1942, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King sent him to China to establish weather stations and "to heckle the Japanese."

Dai Li took Miles on a trip into occupied China and impressed him with how easily the Juntong could operate behind Japanese lines. Before the trip was over, Dai proposed the creation of a 50,000 strong Chinese guerrilla army under Sino-American control. Without consulting Washington, Miles agreed, and the two started working on the creation of what became the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) to carry out espionage, special operations, and signals intelligence. The Chinese would provide the manpower; the United States the rest. Dai Li would be the SACO director, Miles his deputy.

Washington's approval of the SACO agreement required that Miles be appointed chief of OSS activities in China. OSS chief "Wild Bill" Donovan resisted the idea,

but because OSS needed a Chinese base for its Asia operations, he agreed to "an unhappy alliance with Miles and Dai Li." The OSS was admitted to China "as subordinate partners of General Dai Li's intelligence service." Personnel from OSS and the US Navy started arriving at Dai Li's base, "Happy Valley," outside Chunking to instruct Dai's people in everything from guerrilla warfare to criminal investigation, even an "FBI school" to train Dai Li's secret police.

There were problems from the start. Dai's secret police were directed against Chiang's internal enemies rather than the Japanese. There was the matter of torture: Happy Valley, which had a sanitized mess hall and western toilets for the Americans, also had "a grim prison about which unpleasant stories were told." There was Miles, who insisted that nothing be kept secret from the Chinese; they would work directly with the Americans and everything would be shared. There was Dai Li, whose hand was seen in thwarted OSS operations. Free Thai agents being infiltrated into Thailand were delayed and several killed. Dai Li had his own plans. He would invade Thailand with a force of 10,000 Chinese guerrillas disguised as Thai—on 10,000 Tibetan ponies.

The situation was further complicated by Allied suspicions that Dai was trading secrets with Japanese intelligence. In October 1943, Donovan was ordered to gather intelligence in China's communist-controlled areas. Donovan told Roosevelt, "We cannot do our job as an American intelligence service unless we operate as an entirely independent one, independent of the Chinese and our other allies." The president agreed.

Donovan visited China in late 1943. Over a dinner in Dai Li's residence, Donovan told the spymaster that OSS would work unilaterally inside China. Dai responded that he would execute any OSS agent found operating outside the SACO agreement. Donovan slammed his fist on the table and shouted, "For every one of our agents you kill, we will kill one of your generals!" The next day Donovan met with Chiang Kai-shek, who spoke of Chinese sovereignty, and asked that OSS act accordingly.

Leaving Miles to work with Dai Li's operations, Donovan circumvented them both and secretly set up a separate clandestine OSS intelligence collection mechanism. The senior US officer in the China-Burma-India Theater, General Joseph Stilwell, was no help, but in the 14th Air Force commander, General Claire Chennault, Donovan found an ally. Chennault had served as Chiang's aviation adviser since 1937. He had no use for Dai Li and had turned down an early offer to work together. But as the war expanded, Chennault's bombers needed more intelligence than the Chinese could provide. He created his own network of American operatives who worked behind Japanese lines.

Chennault agreed to work with Donovan. The result was the 5329th Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff (AGFRTS), or "Ag-farts," as it was popularly called. OSS would run operations inside Japanese territory using the 14th Air Force as cover from the Chinese. Donovan later wrote: "AGFRTS succeeded where SACO had failed, and its results were almost immediately apparent." OSS agents behind the lines gathered intelligence on Japanese shipping and rail traffic and other targets, interrogated prisoners, trained guerrillas, sometimes engaged in guerrilla warfare, and did a host of other things important to the war effort.

By contrast, "no intelligence or operations of any consequence have come out of SACO," Donovan reported to Roosevelt in November 1944. The judgment is shared by Wakeman and other historians. It was Dai Li and his "clandestine empire" that benefited. Dai Li emerged from the war at the pinnacle of his power. But as the postwar repositioning began, he became convinced that Chiang intended to abolish the Juntong. In the spring of 1946, rumors of Dai Li's retirement were rife. On 17 March 1946, an aircraft carrying Dai Li crashed into the hills outside Nanjing. Dai Li was dead, but many refused to believe it. Some blamed the crash on communist sabotage, others on a bomb planted by OSS. The most common rumor was that Dai Li had faked his own death.

But Dai Li was dead, and it was bad weather that did it, not the OSS. He was buried on a hillside outside Nanjing, not far from Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum. In 1949, his remains were destroyed by the communists. A hero to some, a demon to others, Dai Li with his genius for organization had created the largest spying machine of its time, but reviews of its effectiveness are mixed. Its success was greatest against Chiang's internal enemies and dissidents of his regime, less so against the Japanese and their collaborators, where intelligence collection was subordinated to the lucrative trade between the Chinese and Japanese under the guise of infiltrating each other. With the Juntong's main target, the Chinese Communist Party, there appears to have been only limited success, but here Wakeman and other historians necessarily depend on information that comes mainly from former Dai Li agents re-educated by the communists.

While the current utility of the lessons of intelligence cooperation are relatively clear—intelligence partners almost always give precedence to self-interest; sovereignty is likely to trump better sense; and mismatches in cultural norms strain, if not make impossible, good relationships—other elements of Wakeman's meticulous scholarship are worth noting for what they might say about China's present intelligence apparatus and about the way in which such organizations might form in periods of national stress.

First, Wakeman's research reveals the bewildering array of organizations and personal connections that eventually grew into an internal security apparatus. Organizational sprouts—societies, unions, clubs, cliques, etc.—large and small, came and went in the chaotic environment of newly republican China. Many thought themselves destined for big things but were gone or aimless soon after they were created. Amazingly, Wakeman seemed to have found them all in the minutest detail—it is the feature of this book that makes it such difficult reading at times. His effort, however, speaks to the energy, dynamism, and potential for manipulation of Chinese intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s who were looking in almost every conceivable direction for ways to combat the Japanese (or other enemies) and to bring the nation into modern times. This chaotic scene eventually coalesced in 1949, but Wakeman's effort is a powerful reminder of the complexity of the underlying coalition and the challenges that complexity presents in understanding China and the responses of its people in difficult times, and in knowing with whom to deal in such eras of change in China or anywhere.

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L'espionne: Virginia Hall, une Americaine dans la guerre

Vincent Nouzille. (In French) Paris: Fayard, 2007, pp 452, illus.

Reviewed by M.R.D. Foot

This new biography of Virginia Hall is a great improvement on its predecessor, reviewed by "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" reviewer Hayden Peake in 2005.[1] Monsieur Nouzille understands France, as a Frenchman should, and has worked hard, both in the archives of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), in family papers, and with a few surviving resisters on the spots where his heroine made her clandestine name.

The daughter of a Baltimore magnate, Hall was born in 1906, outstanding at school and at several East Coast colleges, brought up to love Europe, and fluent in several languages. Her first ambition was to be a diplomat, but she got no further than secretarial jobs in US consulates before a shooting accident in Turkey in 1933 cost her the part of her left leg, thus disqualifying her for promotion.

She stayed in Europe, working occasionally as a journalist, and served in an ambulance unit during the collapse of the French army during May–June 1940. Having a neutral nation's passport, she managed to escape to England, where accidental friendships brought her into touch with the nascent British subversive service, the SOE.

She was taken on by the French ("F") Section of that service; she was sworn to secrecy, and sent back to France by boat to Lisbon and onward by train in her own real name. Undercover as a correspondent for the *New York Post*, she submitted a stream of articles to the paper. Hall settled in Lyons, where she had an apartment in her own name and a hotel room—later, another apartment—under a cover name, from which she could conduct her clandestine operations; less respectably, she made friends with a bawd, who could provide valuable intelligence and contacts.

Hall became the lynchpin of her section's activities in unoccupied southern France; providing money and moral support for her fellow agents, keeping Lon-

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[1] Hayden Peake, *Studies in Intelligence* 49 no. 4, "Review of *The Wolves at the Door: The True Story of America's Greatest Spy*," 79–82.

don supplied with useful intelligence, and occasionally helping downed airmen to escape.

Nouzille provides plenty of detail on the circuits she maintained and reveals that in August 1942 she fell into a familiar trap. Abbé Robert Alesch, a double-agent working for the Abwehr, had wormed his way into her confidence and unraveled many of the plots she was engaged in before she skipped, just in time. The day after Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of northwestern Africa, triggered the German occupation of southern France, Hall fled Lyons and managed to find a reliable line, on foot, across the Pyrenees.

She eventually got safely back to London and was interrogated in detail. A few months' service in Madrid for SOE's escape section bored her; she returned to London, worked as a briefing officer in F Section, and trained as a wireless telegraph operator. F Section thought her too well known to the enemy to be allowed back into France. She got there all the same, in the spring of 1944, nominally as an agent of OSS, running a circuit called *Saint* (her previous codename had been *Heckler*) in central France, with the personal codename of *Diane*. She survived as best she could during that tumultuous summer, secured several useful arms drops to give teeth to the Maquis, which wanted to fight, and at last had a stroke of personal good fortune. She and Paul Goillot, a Paris-born New Yorker eight years her junior and a late arrival in one of the Jedburgh teams, fell for each other.

She was awarded, besides a membership in the Order of the British Empire, the American Distinguished Service Cross—the first woman to receive it—but refused to attend any public celebration of the fact. She returned to Maryland, where her mother disapproved her relation with Goillot, whom she eventually married nevertheless in 1957.

When the CIA was formed to resume the work of the dissolved OSS, she joined it and worked for it, unobtrusively as always, but did not greatly care for the work, nor did the Agency always cherish her. She retired when she was 60 and lived 16 years longer on a farm in Maryland; saying always to those who tried to get her to talk, "Many of my friends were killed for talking too much."

This excellent account of one of the war's most remarkable secret agents is in splendidly clear French; a translation into English would be most welcome.

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The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

This issue's Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf is an abbreviated one because Hayden Peake is recovering from injuries suffered in an accident. We hope to resume normal coverage with our next issue.–Editor.

Jennet Conant, ***The Irregulars: Roald Dahl and the British Spy Ring in Wartime Washington*** (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 391 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

During WW II, Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter pilots attributed unexpected equipment malfunctions to 6 inch tall "little men" they called gremlins. The fanciful tales told about these mischievous creatures soon spread to the public and in 1943 were collected in a 46 page book titled *The Gremlins: A Royal Air Force Story*. Published by Walt Disney Productions, the book depicted gremlins with red noses and two horns. The text describing their adventures was written by RAF fighter pilot Roald Dahl, whose second book, *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory,*[1] made him famous as an author of children's books. In *The Irregulars*, Jennet Conant attempts to make him famous as a spy.

The book gets off to a wobbly start. In the preface, Conant portrays Dahl as "caught up in the complex web of intrigue masterminded by [William] Stephenson, the legendary Canadian spymaster, who outmaneuvered the FBI and State Department and managed to create an elaborate clandestine organization whose purpose was to weaken the isolationist forces in America and influence U.S. policy in favor of Britain." (xv) Each of these assertions is inaccurate. Dahl had nothing to do with weakening isolationist forces in America; he didn't arrive here until 1942, by which time the isolationists were not a factor in US foreign policy. Furthermore, he wasn't assigned to the BSC (British Security Coordination) until 1944 when its value to British intelligence was marginal, as Conant admits. As to outmaneuvering, Conant gives no examples. Stephenson did support the creation of a US foreign intelligence service, but he was not the originator of the idea, nor would it have died had the British failed to support it. While both State and the FBI initially cooperated with BSC, relations cooled in 1942, much sooner than Conant suggests. When the BSC attempted to spread propaganda

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[1] Roald Dahl, *Charlie and the Chocolate Factory* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 163 pp. Copies of the first edition sell today for as much as $15,000.00.

in the media, contrary to its promise not to do so, it became obvious. And Conant doesn't even mention the TRICYCLE double agent case that displayed poor tradecraft by BSC and resulted in TRICYCLE's forced recall to Britain.

As to the BSC itself, there is no evidence at all that Roosevelt used Stephenson as a "back channel" source to Churchill or that Churchill had personally dispatched Stephenson on his mission to the United States. Likewise, contrary to her claims, neither Leslie Howard nor Ian Fleming were recruited by or worked for Stephenson. Perhaps the most absurd historical inaccuracy is Conant's claim that the BSC designation "was a title created arbitrarily by the American FBI director J. Edgar Hoover." (28)

Unfortunately, similar problems exist elsewhere in the book. Some of these are terminological, others are factual, and all claims are undocumented. For example, Conant calls intelligence officers "agents," states that Philby defected with Maclean in 1951 (he defected alone in 1963), and claims that Dahl had duties "along counterintelligence lines" (293) though none are specified. In short, her assessment that "spies are notoriously unreliable narrators," (xix) applies to her own research.

Is the book of any intelligence value at all? Very little. For those interested in WW II Washington society and politics, however, *The Irregulars* has much of significance and Dahl is the centerpiece of attention. Conant describes him as a dashing, sometimes charming, intensely self-centered, 6'6" former RAF fighter pilot assigned first to the British embassy in Washington as air attaché and later, after conflicts with the staff, to the BSC. Despite her endeavors to make Dahl a spy, the closest she gets is to call him an agent-of-influence and to describe his "espionage" as "stockpiling titillating gossip." (146) Here, far too much attention is devoted to Dahl's social connections with President Roosevelt, his wife Eleanor, Vice President Henry Wallace, and the latter's confidant Charles Marsh, a wealthy Texas newspaperman, and the likes of Congresswomen Clare Booth Luce. None of the anecdotes Dahl includes has anything to do with wartime intelligence in America.

Equally interesting, but irrelevant to espionage, are Dahl's literary efforts. Conant discusses them at some length but doesn't seem to find it unusual that Dahl "the spy" had so much time to spare during the war. In the dust jacket blurb for this book, author Jon Meacham notes that *The Irregulars* "is a terrific tale—and it's all true."[2] He may be right about the first part, but just a little fact checking makes it vibrantly apparent that "all true" it is not. The facts available from books in Conant's own espionage bibliography make it clear that Roald Dahl was at best only peripherally involved in the romantic world of espionage. (32)

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[2] Meacham is author of *Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Relationship* (New York: Random House, 2003).

Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire, Graham Macklin, *British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources* (London: National Archives, 2008), 248 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

Dr. Stephen Twigge is the senior historian in Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This book's introduction explains that he and his coauthors researched the intelligence files of the British National Archives with particular attention to those recently released. They wrote *British Intelligence* "to highlight the rich and diverse collection of intelligence records" that they found there. (15) The book is needed, they argue, because the "world of secret intelligence was for decades largely neglected by historians" and public understanding of the topic was "shaped by a steady stream of lurid novels, sensationalist journalism and memoirs written by former practitioners and senior officials." (7) Straight away this criticism raises scholarly warning flags. First, it ignores the pioneering intelligence histories written by Mildred Richings, Christopher Andrew, Nigel West, Stephen Dorril, and Harry Hinsley, to name a few.[3] Second, it tips off to readers that close scrutiny of the work is warranted.

Specifically, the nine chapters of the book seek "to shed light on some of the shadowy aspects of British history, and to provide a framework and guide for all those interested in the history of intelligence." (15) The first seven chapters outline some well known domestic, international, military, naval, air, scientific, and communications intelligence cases. There is a separate chapter on the Special Operations Executive, a WW II sabotage and resistance organization, and a final one that looks at "intelligence in a changing world."

A glance at the primary sources found in the endnotes suggests that *British Intelligence* has accomplished its goal of "shedding light" by using the National Archive's files. A closer examination, however, reveals that more than 100 facts mentioned in the narrative are either not documented at all or not supported by the sources cited. The complete list is unprintable here, but the few examples that follow should make the point.

In several cases National Archive file numbers are cited to document erroneous statements. For example, the role of the Twenty Committee in WW II was not, as claimed, made public in 1972 in the book *The Double Cross System.* (41) That distinction belongs to Ladislas Farago and his book, *The Game of the Foxes.*[4] Similarly, KGB agent and SIS officer George Blake was not an "MI6 double agent" as stated. (45) The errors concerning the "Cambridge spy ring" are particularly egregious, since no citations at all are provided and the truth has been publicly known for years. Philby did not join the Communist Party of Great Britain, nor was he, Cairncross, or Maclean, a member of the secret Apostles Society as claimed. Furthermore, Yuri Modin was not the wartime

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[3] M. G. Richings, *Espionage: The Story of the Secret Service of the English Crown* (London: Hutchinson, 1934); Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service* (New York: Viking, 1986); Nigel West, *Counterfeit Spies* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 1998); Stephen Dorril, *MI6* (New York: The Free Press, 2000); F. H. Hinsley, et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1986-1993), 6 volumes.
[4] Ladislas Farago, *The Game of the Foxes* (New York: David McKay & Co., 1971).

handler of Burges and Maclean (201)—he didn't arrive in London until after the war. Cairncross died in England not France. And the broken codes that revealed Maclean's treachery were the NKVD's not diplomatic. (82)

In this same undocumented category the authors write that William Stephenson was a "trusted confidant" of Churchill and that he had "the code name *Intrepid,*" assertions disproved by West among others. (75) Likewise, they state that Igor Gouzenko, perhaps the most famous of the early Soviet defectors, was a diplomat handled by Zabotin, when in fact he was a code clerk handled by Motinov. (227) Even more surprising is the claim that the Rosenberg network was identified by the VENONA operation—the FBI solved that case. Also, the code name VENONA was assigned in 1954 not 1948. (258)

Regrettably, details dealing with the later periods of intelligence history also contain inaccuracies. For example, the statement that the codeword CORONA was based on "the brand of typewriter on the desk of the CIA director running the program" (163) is only one of two possible explanations for the naming of that program. The other is that it was suggested by a planner who was smoking a Corona cigar when the naming question arose.[5] Other facts about the early photo satellite programs are at variance with more reliable sources, as for example, Richelson.[6] And anyone with access to the World Wide Web can verify that the "Open Source Center," created in 2005, is not "a division of the CIA," it having been plucked, bureaucratically speaking, out of CIA and placed under the office of the Director of National Intelligence that year.

A summary assessment of *British Intelligence* is that despite the authors' access to the intelligence files in the National Archives, their contribution to intelligence history is a flawed work.

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[5] See Robert A. McDonald, *CORONA: Between the Sun & the Earth—The First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space* (Bethesda, MD: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997), 58, fn. 51.
[6] Jeffrey T. Richelson, *America's Secret Eyes in Space* (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).